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DIVINE COMMAND MORALITY 
AND THE AUTONOMY OF ETHICS
Robert Audi
This paper formulates a kind of divine command ethical theory intended 
to comport with two major views: that basic moral principles are necessary 
truths and that necessary truths are not determined by divine will. The theory 
is based on the possibility that obligatoriness can be a theological property 
even if its grounds are such that the content of our obligations has a priori lim-
its. As developed in the paper, the proposed divine command theory is com-
patible with the centrality of God in practical ethics; it provides an account 
of a divine command morality as a set of internalized moral standards; and 
it is consistent with the autonomy of ethics conceived as a domain in which 
knowledge is possible independently of reliance on theology or religion.
Divine command morality has very commonly appeared to religious be-
lievers to provide the only correct view of moral standards. Among be-
lievers in the tradition of Western monotheism, particularly Christians, 
Jews, and Muslims, some version of it is oft en endorsed or presupposed. 
But there are many versions, and for some of them the degree of harmony 
with various non-religious ethical theories is unclear. What metaethical 
options are possible for divine command theorists? I am particularly in-
terested in whether there is a kind of divine command theory harmoni-
ous with two major views: fi rst, that necessary truths are not determined 
by divine will; second, that basic moral principles are necessary truths. A 
further concern of the paper is to explore what range of normative stan-
dards a divine command ethics may endorse, and how extensively these 
may overlap those of, say, a Kantian or utilitarian theory. I will present a 
version of divine command theory that apparently does justice to what 
is naturally called the autonomy of ethics. If the theory is sound, it may 
enable us both to avoid the Euthyphro problem and to account for the 
guiding role that some version of divine command theory should play for 
religious believers.
I. Divine Command Ethics
It is important to distinguish two possible kinds of divine command ethi-
cal theory—the theoretical basis of what I call divine command morality and 
take to be an overall moral position that includes normative standards for 
daily life. The two kinds of divine command ethical theory I refer to are 
semantic and ontic versions of it. On a semantic version, moral terms have 
theological meaning (and moral concepts are correspondingly theological). 
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For instance, ‘obligatory,’ in its central, moral sense, might be held to mean 
‘commanded (for us) by God.’ Ontic versions deny a semantic equivalence, 
but, in the form of the ontic theory that seems most plausible, the property 
of being obligatory is identical either with that of being commanded by 
God or with some property closely related to this.1 Most ontic versions 
assert something that is (in a way) stronger: that obligatoriness (for acts) 
is constituted by being divinely commanded, directly or indirectly. Here 
we have a constitutive relation of a kind that implies an explanatory con-
nection between God’s commanding something and its being obligatory. 
Identity relations are not (in the same way) explanatory. Consider, for in-
stance the identity expressed by co-referential proper names. Cicero is not 
constituted by being Tully, and we learn nothing about his nature from 
discovering this other name.2
The suggested identity between the property of obligatoriness and that 
of divine commandedness would, then, be a case of ontic equivalence: 
equivalence at the metaphysical level of the nature of the elements in 
question, by contrast with the level of the meanings of linguistic terms 
that express or describe those elements. Similar identities would hold 
for the other deontic terms in the same family. Although I shall gener-
ally speak of obligatoriness rather than use the full range of moral terms 
in this family, for example ‘permissible,’ ‘wrong,’ and ‘required,’ what is 
wrong can be conceived as that which we are obligated to avoid, what is 
right as what we are not obligated not to do, and so forth. (We could also 
take ‘wrong’ as terminologically most basic, but here I see no advantage in 
this.) I defer the question whether all obligations corresponding to divine 
commands are moral, as opposed to, say, religious; but, for specifi city, one 
might conceive moral obligatoriness as moral commandedness, religious 
obligatoriness as religious commandedness, etc.
The semantic and ontic versions of divine command theory are impor-
tantly diﬀ erent. If the semantic view is correct, someone who has no con-
cept of God cannot even understand moral terms; they would be conceptu-
ally beyond the person’s ken. Moreover, someone who has the concept of 
God but believes there is no God would have to deny that there is anything 
objectively obligatory. The notion of what is commanded by God would 
have to be considered vacuous. Such a person could regard some ascrip-
tions of obligation by theists as excusable, perhaps even as rational given 
the evidences some people might have for them, but not as true. For apart 
from God’s existence there would be no basis for objective obligation.
On the ontic view, however, the concept of the obligatory, like other 
moral concepts, need not be theological. One implication of this is that al-
though an obligatory act could not fail to be divinely commanded at least 
implicitly, one could still know that an act is obligatory without knowing 
that it is so commanded. Identifying moral with theological properties 
does not automatically foreclose the number or variety of cognitive han-
dles by which we can grasp moral properties. Just as one can know one is 
reading the author of King Lear without knowing one is reading the author 
of The Winter’s Tale, or (to take a closer analogy) know one is drawing a 
circle without knowing one is drawing a plane fi gure whose circumfer-
ence equals its diameter times pi, one can know that an act is obligatory 
without knowing that it is divinely commanded.
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We might plausibly suppose that God intends us to have many ways 
of discovering our obligations. There are various reasons to suppose this. 
For one thing, the existence of many non-theological ways of ascertaining 
our obligations might enhance the probability of right conduct for non-
believers; they would have more ways to discover what they should do. 
Second, a diversity of routes to moral knowledge might reinforce moral 
conduct in other ways. It might add motivation and understanding re-
garding them even if believers did not discover any obligations they were 
otherwise unaware of. Third, it might help them to determine what ac-
tions morality requires where, as is common, this is not clear from their 
understanding of their religious commitments. That may occur because 
these commitments confl ict with one another or because they are insuﬃ  -
ciently specifi c. Fourth, for anyone concerned with explaining and justify-
ing moral conduct, it is oft en valuable to have more than one perspective 
from which to frame an explanatory or justifi catory account. In practice, 
then, those who hold an ontic divine command theory—as some natural 
law theorists might—can take a point of view from which they can see 
moral issues in non-theological terms. In principle, they can view these 
issues much as do those who take moral properties to be independent of 
divine command or even divine will.
In the light of the points so far made about divine command ethics, it 
may be possible to bring the divine command and secular perspectives 
closer together. Suppose initially that we take the property of being oblig-
atory to be the same property as that of being divinely commanded. In-
stead of stopping there, however, we might take “both” properties (i.e., the 
property expressed by the theological phrase ‘divinely commanded’ and 
the property expressed by the non-theological phrase ‘being obligatory’) 
to be (necessarily) consequential, in a strong sense, on non-moral, “natu-
ral” properties belonging to the type of obligatory act in question.3 For 
instance, acts of loyalty to one’s family or religious community might be 
both obligatory in virtue of one’s special relation to them—involving, say, 
one’s promising them support—and also (freely) commanded by God for 
that very range of reasons. The divine commandedness of an act, which on 
this view is the same property as its obligatoriness, is thus in a sense em-
bedded in its non-moral grounds.4 The act is divinely commanded (at least 
in part) on the same grounds in virtue of which it is obligatory.
We now have both a kind of divine command theory—since obliga-
toriness is identifi ed with divine commandedness—and something that 
not every such theory provides for: a necessary basis for such commands, 
in the light of which we can understand both their infallibility and their 
relation to certain kinds of natural properties. These natural (roughly, “de-
scriptive”) properties are the same ones central for understanding moral 
concepts and moral properties outside theological contexts. This is as it 
should be on the plausible assumption that properties F and G (as ex-
pressed by diﬀ erent terms, such as ‘commandedness’ and ‘obligatoriness’) 
are identical only if anything possessing them has them in virtue of the 
same property or set of properties.5 In rough terms, they are identically 
grounded. Moreover, in the light of these properties we can see, even with-
out relying on theological considerations, the appropriateness of the com-
mands. The grounding of the moral properties in natural ones—natural in 
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the broad sense of ‘descriptive’—can be (and I think is in such cases and 
here assume to be) a priori as well as necessary. But the position that moral 
properties are consequential on broadly natural ones could probably also 
be worked out for a theory on which the grounding relations are empirical 
and perhaps even contingent.6 It may also apply to persons very diﬀ erent 
from us, but my concern is morality as applicable to human beings.
II. Divine Commandedness Versus Divine Commandability
On the a priori groundedness version of divine command theory, stan-
dards of morality need not be construed as based on God’s commands, 
even if these standards necessarily accord with God’s will as, in moral 
matt ers, infallibly encompassing the right. Specifi cally, provided we con-
sider an act’s moral properties to be necessarily possessed given their 
non-moral grounds—their base, in one terminology—we may assume 
that necessarily, to be obligatory is to be divinely commanded, or at least 
divinely commandable. For the property in question, which we can refer 
to both theologically and in purely moral language, is possessed in virtue 
of a single set of non-moral (and “descriptive”) properties.
Why speak of what is commandable rather than commanded? One rea-
son is to allow for the possibility that general moral truths hold even in 
a world in which God issues no commands. Granted, it is an implication 
of most divine command theories that if God had issued no commands, 
there would be no obligations. But although it seems possible that God 
not have given moral commands, it does not seem possible that killing 
people not be (prima facie) wrong; and even devout theists may hold that 
God prefers our being able to see this moral truth through natural reason 
rather than only through divine command.
Indexed vs. General Commandability
It may seem, however, that divine commandability is simply the possi-
bility of being commanded by any being that is (essentially) omniscient, 
omnipotent, and omnibenevolent—for short, omnicompetent—hence is an 
“ideal observer.” Call this modal property general divine commandability. 
This is not what is in question where we refer to ‘commandability by God’ 
as this phrase would be used by theists, who presuppose God’s existence.7 
Call the modal property in question indexed divine commandability. The rela-
tion between these two properties is a complicated matt er,8 but the main 
point here is simply that they diﬀ er. It is indexed commandability that I am 
suggesting as a possible candidate for ontic identity with obligatoriness.
An alternative position—open to divine command theorists whether 
or not they hold the a priori groundedness view I have outlined—is a 
commandedness view on which an act is obligatory provided it is of a 
type that, at some time, God commands, at least indirectly.9 Thus, suppose 
abstention from bearing false witness is commanded explicitly; and sup-
pose further that, from the content of the command, it clearly follows that 
a form of bearing such witness is looking on without exhibiting any disap-
proval or doubt when one person accuses another of a crime one knows 
the second did not commit. Such complicity might be regarded as indi-
rectly prohibited by the original command.
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As this example suggests, it is not always clear what follows from a com-
mand, or, especially, what follows with suﬃ  cient clarity and has an appro-
priate character to be construed as indirectly commanded by God in issuing 
the original command. Moreover, I would stress again that on a command-
edness view, if God had issued no commands, we would have no obliga-
tions. This seems implausible, especially on the a priori groundedness view 
of basic moral principles. To be sure, God’s goodness implies God’s in some 
sense wishing us to do the kinds of deeds that are obligatory. But it is far 
from self-evident that such goodness entails issuing commands.
The seriousness of these problems for a commandedness view is one 
reason to explore a commandability view.10 A morality must be capable of 
guiding action in practical aﬀ airs; and if what is obligatory is just what is 
actually commanded, there should be no avoidable unclarity about what 
that is. Some unclarity seems unavoidable in ethical matt ers, however, 
particularly where what is commanded is not itself an action, as in the 
case of love.11 This kind of unclarity can help to inspire supererogation. 
Still, on the assumption that what is actually divinely commanded is com-
mandable, focusing on the latt er notion enables theistic moral agents to 
look both for what is actually but implicitly commanded and for diﬀ erent 
sources of obligation that meet the standard of commandability yet do not 
depend on the historical property of commandedness. This has both prac-
tical advantages in making moral decisions and theoretical advantages in 
understanding obligation.
The Property of Obligatoriness
Once commandability is seen as an option for divine command ethics, it 
may look promising to identify the property of obligatoriness not with 
that of being in accord with some divine command, but with some inten-
tional and presumably volitional divine state or preference. On this view, 
the property of being obligatory might be conceived as that of accordance 
with divine will regarding the actions of persons like us. An act-type’s 
having this property does not entail God’s actually commanding it for us, 
even indirectly.12
It is not easy to specify just what kind of accordance with divine will 
is the best candidate here. Mere divine approval is not enough, for mere-
ly permissible acts may merit that. What of supererogatory ones? These 
might merit divine gratifi cation, which does not hold even for all obliga-
tory acts. Moreover, they contrast with obligatory acts in that their non-
performance need not merit divine disapproval. To be sure, if one faces an 
exclusive disjunction of supererogatory acts, performance of exactly one 
might still be gratifying to God despite non-performance of the other. But 
here non-performance of both would not merit disapproval, as opposed, 
perhaps, to disappointment.
Two important points follow from the suggested property identifi ca-
tion. First, it is metaphysically impossible that being obligatory (for hu-
man persons) and being in accord with God’s will (for their actions), not 
apply to the same deeds, where accordance with God’s will, in the rel-
evant sense, is distinct from merely meeting God’s approval. But, second, 
since the two concepts in question are diﬀ erent, we may still say both 
that the application of the property of (moral) obligatoriness to a type of 
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action can be known on non-theological ground—indeed on naturalis-
tic grounds—and that theists as well as non-theists can make use of this 
point in conducting their ethical life. Indeed, the view shares with the 
commandedness view the implication that divine commands (or other re-
ligiously endorsed moral standards) may be criterial for right and wrong. 
The commandability view is even consistent with taking such criteria to 
provide metaphysically necessary and suﬃ  cient conditions; the property 
of obligatoriness, however, would not be taken to be, or to be grounded 
in, that of commandedness.
This commandability interpretation of divine command theory, then, 
provides both for the necessary coincidence of obligation with an aspect 
of the divine will and for a wider range of valid routes to moral knowl-
edge than one would expect to fi nd given a commandedness interpreta-
tion. One may still know what is obligatory through knowing what God 
commands. But some obligatory acts that are not commanded might merit 
God’s command, roughly in the sense that, though they need not be com-
manded, given the divine nature and the relevant non-moral facts God’s 
commanding them would be on balance a kind of injunction it is reason-
able to expect; and here non-theological considerations concerning the 
natural grounds of obligation may be essential, and uniquely helpful, in 
understanding God’s will.
The Euthyphro Problem and the Grounds of Obligation
It may now be apparent how the a priori groundedness view enables us 
to deal with the Euthyphro problem, which (in one version) is the prob-
lem of whether what is right, in the sense of ‘obligatory,’ is such because 
God commands it, or whether, instead, God commands it because it is 
right. Supposing that obligatoriness is the property of commandedness, 
we may deny both that the obligatory must be regarded as such because 
God commands it, i.e., as grounded in divine command, and that God com-
mands it because it is obligatory. The fi rst claim is mistaken because acts 
are obligatory on the basis of certain descriptive properties (not including 
commandedness13); the second is mistaken because it is in part on the basis 
of those properties that God commands the acts, not on the basis of their 
rightness. In rough terms, God commands certain acts not because they are 
right but (at least in part) because of why they are right; i.e., because of the 
elements in virtue of which they are the right thing to do.
God may be seen, then, as having a reason—indeed an a priori though 
prima facie one—for commanding certain deeds. This is not because there 
are moral principles above God; sound moral principles, as necessary and 
a priori, are instead within God. If murder is necessarily wrong, God can-
not command it. But this ‘cannot’ refl ects inconsistency with the divine na-
ture; and it expresses no more limitation on omnipotence than is implied 
by the impossibility of a circle’s not being a plane fi gure whose circumfer-
ence is equal to its diameter multiplied by pi.
The Euthyphro problem may also be stated in terms of commandabil-
ity and then approached similarly. Indeed, this approach seems preferable 
because God’s reasons for actually commanding a kind of act need not be 
those in virtue of which (since they ground its obligatoriness), it merits com-
mand. We must distinguish between God’s reasons for issuing a command 
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at a particular time, as where God might command a deed in order to mo-
tivate the agent to perform it, and God’s reasons for taking the content of a 
command, performance of the relevant act-type, to be obligatory for us. The 
latt er, divine commandatory att itude, is possible both apart from God’s is-
suing a command at all and aft er a command is issued.
There is a further reason for taking a kind of commandability, in roughly 
the sense of ‘meriting divine command,’ to be central for divine command 
ethics. At least the majority of the moral principles that guide everyday 
life—including some apparently having a kind of Biblical endorsement—
express prima facie rather than absolute obligations. The obligation to avoid 
lying is an example; and, at least on the assumption that the obligation not 
to kill is restricted in content to non-self-defensive cases, even that obliga-
tion seems to be prima facie rather than indefeasible. As Ross and many 
other philosophers have stressed, prima facie obligations can confl ict; and 
when they do, it may not be clear what one’s fi nal obligation is, i.e., what, 
overall, one ought to do.14 If we take a commandability view, we can treat 
particular acts representing what one is fi nally obligated to do as meriting 
divine command even though they are not always actually commanded. 
A similar case occurs where two competing acts are equally choicewor-
thy; there may be no unclarity about this, and here neither is commanded 
even if their disjunction merits divine command and is commanded. Once 
again, we have deeds that meet God’s approval, yet are not commanded.
This approach allows taking what God has actually commanded as 
also commandable, on the assumption that God would not command 
what does not merit command. But commands to obey principles, such as 
the injunction to honor our parents, may be understood as creating prima 
facie obligations and hence, in some possible cases, as not representing 
those commandable acts that are our fi nal obligation. What constitutes 
our fi nal obligation may, owing to a confl ict of prima facie obligations, be 
determinable only by refl ection. Where two or more actions are equally 
good ways to do our duty, only their disjunction need be taken as merit-
ing divine command; each, to be sure, intrinsically merits performance, 
but an act that competes with one that is equally good does not merit 
being divinely commanded, since that implies that performing the other 
merits disapproval.
In this context, it is signifi cant that the two commands Jesus singles out 
as primary are to love God with all our hearts and to love our neighbors as 
ourselves (Matt hew 22: 38–40). These do not even purport to specify act-
types, and their connection with action is indirect. Loving our neighbors is 
not an act or set of acts, though there are of course acts of love and—more 
important here—acts of nurturing and communicating the kind of love 
in question. We are to discover the appropriate acts, inner and outer, by 
(among other things) appropriately internalizing scripture and following 
the right role models, above all Jesus himself. The commandments stand 
as a challenge to human freedom.
If, moreover, we take knowledge of necessary truths to be inherent in 
the divine nature, we can also say that obligatory actions are those that 
are in a certain way in accord with God’s nature. The accord, moreover, 
is not merely with God’s cognitive nature—with the divine intellect. On 
the assumption of omnibenevolence, we may take it that God would 
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wish us to fulfi ll our moral obligations and that doing so accords with 
the divine will.
III. Commandability and the Motivational Autonomy of Theological Reasons
Suppose that, by taking an act’s obligatoriness as identical with the prop-
erty of meriting divine command, we move from a divine command 
theory strictly so called to the kind of divine commandability theory I 
have outlined. This property, as contrasted with merely meeting God’s ap-
proval, seems at least equivalent to, and perhaps identical with, being in 
accordance with God’s will. The concept of such accord is diﬀ erent from 
that of meriting divine command, but both concepts can express the same 
property yet still play diﬀ erent roles in motiving moral conduct. Even if 
the ontic grounds of obligation (the grounds of the truth of moral prin-
ciples) are not determined by divine volition, the motivational grounds of 
moral conduct can be religious, and the more concepts a religious believer 
has that connect motivation with divine will and commands, the wider 
the range of possible motivating considerations.
To see this point, consider how fi nely motivational att itudes are in-
dividuated. Even if the property of being obligatory is the property of 
(indexed) divine commandability (of meriting divine command), doing 
something, such as distributing food to the poor, in order to fulfi ll God’s 
command (or to act in accord with God’s will) does not entail doing it in 
order (say) to help the poor as required by the obligation of benefi cence. 
These are diﬀ erent purposive properties of the act, and neither entails the 
other: one could be motivated to do something by its meriting divine com-
mand (where the command might or might not have been issued) inde-
pendently of being motivated do to it as obligatory under benefi cence. 
Indeed, suppose I believe that deontic properties and other normative 
properties are not grounded in divine will but only harmonious with it 
in a certain way. I can still be motivated in my moral life by desires to 
do what accords with God’s will. Divine commands can be writt en in the 
heart and derive motivational power from devotion, even if, intellectu-
ally, I take their grounds to be descriptive and non-theological. I would 
then have a divine command morality even if my divine command ethical 
theory is ontologically moderate in the indicated way. Perhaps, then, such 
a moderate theory is fully compatible with true piety.
Two Dimensions of Divine Will
We should now distinguish (as Aquinas did) between God’s antecedent 
will and consequent will, i.e., “God’s preference, regarding a particular 
issue considered rather narrowly in itself, other things equal ...[as op-
posed to] God’s preference regarding the matt er, all things considered.”15 
What God antecedently wills seems analogous to what is prima facie 
obligatory: such deeds have an obligation-making property but are fi -
nally obligatory only if there is no overriding prima facie obligation.16 A 
fi nally obligatory act is commandable; but this does not entail that it is di-
vinely commanded or willed in any sense implying that it must occur—at 
least on the assumption that it would then not be free. Let us assume 
that, given omnipotence, what God wills in this third way—imperativally, 
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we might say—must occur. We cannot, then, plausibly regard obligatori-
ness as equivalent to what God wills in that way. Plainly, not everything 
obligatory is actually done.
This second interpretation of accord with God’s will—namely, being 
harmonious with God’s antecedent will—leaves open, however, the pos-
sibility that some actual divine commands, such as the command to Abra-
ham to sacrifi ce his son, either do not directly refl ect God’s consequent 
will or do not refl ect it in the way they appear to. For instance, one might 
say that what accords with God’s will in this case is just deliberative obedi-
ence, obedience at the level of intention-formation (and perhaps prepa-
ratory acts), not behavioral obedience, actually carrying out the deed. This 
would parallel the distinction between the issuance of a command’s being in 
accordance with God’s will and its execution’s being in accord with God’s 
will. Using that distinction, we might say that commandedness of an act 
does not entail its commandability in the sense implying accordance with 
God’s consequent will; it is the commanding, and presumably Abraham’s 
deliberative obedience, that accords with this. Whatever we say here, the 
case raises diﬃ  culties for the view that obligatoriness is or is grounded in 
commandedness. Rather than pursue possible resolutions of those diﬃ  -
culties,17 our purposes are bett er served by proceeding to the question of 
the connection between the right and the good in relation to the suggested 
moderate form of divine command ethical theory.
I have already spoken of divine commands as creating (moral) obliga-
tions, as where God commands honoring our parents.18 Divine creation of 
obligations may seem incompatible with moral obligations’ being neces-
sarily consequential on natural properties. It is not. Suppose that in virtue 
of our special relationship to our parents, we ought to honor them (and 
owe them gratitude). This does not prevent God’s command to honor them 
from both entailing that we have this (prima facie) obligation and creat-
ing an additional obligation to honor them. The command both exhibits 
the obligatoriness of the indicated conduct and authoritatively calls on 
us to act accordingly. One way to see this is to take God to be providing a 
ground for doing the things in question by commanding them and—given 
our owing obedience to God—thereby creating a further source of obliga-
tion for doing them.
The a priori groundedness view, then, implies only that God does not 
create the grounding relation between the broadly natural base proper-
ties and the obligation consequential upon them; it does not imply that 
God does not create the grounds that, in accordance with that relation, 
actually yield obligations, possibly including some we do not have apart 
from receiving the commands. That the necessary connections between 
the natural grounds of obligation and the obligatoriness of certain kinds of 
acts is part of the divine nature does not in the least prevent God’s doing 
an unlimited number of things that result in our having both moral obli-
gations and reliable ways of ascertaining them. Indeed, an act, for instance 
distributing food to the poor, can even be properly said to be obligatory 
because God commands it so long as this is understood consistently with 
the command’s generating obligation in virtue of the basic, non-volitional 
grounds of God’s moral authority over us, such as creating, sustaining, 
and loving us. Commandedness is not the basic ground of obligation, as 
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on some divine command views, but a command may be supported by 
such a ground and thereby generate obligation.
The Centrality of God on the Commandability View
We now have the raw materials for answering a further question raised 
by any divine command theory that identifi es obligatoriness with com-
mandability or a similar (indexed) theological property. What does the 
proposed commandability theory add to the general idea that obligatori-
ness is simply the property of meriting command by any omnicompetent 
being? Why should it be of any more interest to theists than that kind of 
theological ideal observer theory?
First (as I have already suggested), obligatoriness can be a kind of ac-
cordance with God’s will without being grounded in it, and the proposed 
theory allows God’s will for human action to be motivationally central 
in human conduct. This enables one’s moral practices to be theologically 
grounded; that holds even on an a priori groundedness metaethics. On 
the divine command view outlined here, ascriptions of obligation are, in a 
referential sense, about God. They need not be seen to be, since the concept 
of obligation is not theological; but one may still think of the property 
of obligatoriness under its theological description and be motivated by 
moral considerations within the appropriate theological framework.
Second, on the supposition that God’s consequent will is in question, 
one may take it that doing the required deed for the right reason(s) mer-
its divine approval, just as (inexcusable) non-performance merits divine 
disapproval. This provides theists with an incentive not available through 
an ideal observer theory. Here the right motivating reasons may or may 
not include devotion to God; but in a person of piety they should at least 
indirectly include it.
Third, the role of motivating reasons appropriate to a theist who accepts 
the commandability theory can be brought out by recalling Kant’s distinc-
tion between actions having moral worth and those merely in conformity 
with duty. Let us say that an action has theological worth provided it is 
performed from an appropriate theological motive. A paradigm would 
be serving the sick because one takes this to be commanded by God. One 
could do this on the basis of a sense of the duty of benefi cence as well. The 
action would then also have moral worth, but religious people might be 
strongly motivated to cultivate dispositions whose realization gives opti-
mal theological worth to their conduct.
Observing these distinctions between kinds of commandability and 
kinds of worth leads to a fourth point: theists may consider theological 
reasons for action more valuable than, or at least of a higher order of 
value than, moral reasons; theists might even take them to be the best 
kind to act on. The idea would be that it is even bett er (other things 
equal) to serve the sick out of obedience to God than for a moral reason. 
It may be rare that these two kinds of motivation can act separately in 
the mind of a theist who respects both kinds of reason; but this seems 
a contingent matt er. Theists might, then, take a theological paramountcy 
view, on which theological reasons for action are the “highest” kind, in 
the sense of the best kind to act from when one or more other reasons 
favor the same act.19
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The suggested divine commandability theory is compatible with the 
motivational autonomy of theological reasons. That, in turn, makes room for 
a kind of extreme piety in conduct. It also provides for a theological 
answer to ‘Why should I be moral?’ It might seem that such an answer 
requires grounding morality in divine will, but the force of divine will 
in providing both normative and motivational reasons for action does 
not entail that grounding. Devout theists can live by a divine command 
morality in the sense that every obligation they fulfi ll—though in com-
formity with morality—has theological worth, perhaps even purely theo-
logical worth.20
A fi ft h point is implicit in what has been said about the grounding of 
action. Thinking of obligatoriness as (indexed) commandability provides 
a wider perspective on it than one would have apart from, say, a specifi c 
theology or a particular scriptural tradition or both. One can, however, 
also understand and identify commandability in relation to non-religious 
grounds. Non-religious considerations can help in understanding the 
theological att ribute of (indexed) commandability, just as religious con-
siderations can help in understanding that same att ribute viewed from 
the point of view of understanding and identifying moral obligatoriness. 
Given how oft en morality requires deciding which of two or more con-
fl icting obligations is fi nal, a religious route to moral decision can be both 
morally instructive and motivationally energizing. That one of two such 
acts is a bett er expression of love for one’s neighbor, for instance, can be 
both a motivating and a religiously cogent basis of choice.
We can now see a sixth point: in the not uncommon cases in which 
moral considerations, understood non-theologically, allow two or more 
resolutions of an ethical problem, the fact that there is religious evidence 
for divine preference for one of them may yield good reason to prefer it. 
The reason would not be moral, but would have normative force consis-
tent with any moral truth. Here, then, is a kind of reason that is at once 
normative, being traceable to divine preference, and potentially moti-
vating, yet not available to a mere ideal observer theory. Taking all these 
considerations together, we can perhaps say that the suggested divine 
command theory provides for moral freedom within a framework of nec-
essary principles, but enables devoted theists to exercise that freedom not 
only in determining their fi nal obligation where it mandates a single act 
but—oft en—to avoid having to make arbitrary choices in the many cases 
in which an ideal observer view provides no bett er alternative.
One further question remains for this section. It is natural to say that 
God’s treating us like a loving parent creates an obligation to honor God, 
by virtue of a kind of connection similar to the one that determines our 
having ordinary fi lial obligations toward our parents. But if the base of 
such an obligation includes God’s actions, is it not theological, even if it 
mirrors a moral obligation? One might say this. But if natural properties 
in the broad sense are simply descriptive, certain theological properties 
should be included, and we can speak of a moral obligation to God. This 
is theological in both content and object, hence also a kind of theological 
obligation. It essentially embodies the concept of God and its fulfi llment 
requires God’s existence. But it is not a theological obligation in a sense 
implying grounding of a kind radically diﬀ erent from the kind that is the 
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basis of ordinary moral obligations. Its violation, then, counts as a moral 
wrong as well as a theological wrong.
So far, I have suggested that if an obligation is purely moral, one has 
it in virtue of the non-moral properties that ground it, for instance being 
loved and sustained by a creator having great concern for one’s happi-
ness. But this leaves room for doubly grounded obligations, in the sense 
that there can also be theological grounds yielding an obligation to do 
the same deeds. If knowledge of basic moral truths is indeed part of the 
divine nature (since knowledge of them is an essential property of God), 
it should not be surprising if there is a close analogy between the ground-
ing of theological obligation and that of purely moral obligations. Con-
sider a specifi cally theological obligation, such as an obligation owed to 
God as requiring one to worship in a certain way. This obligation could 
be grounded in elements of a personal relationship with God not fully 
characterizable in non-theological terms, but having fi duciary elements 
similar to those constituting analogous ordinary moral obligations.
A puzzle that arises here is how a divine commandability view ac-
counts for the diﬀ erence between the obligation of (say) veracity and the 
obligation to observe the Sabbath on Sunday rather than some other day 
that, apparently, God could as easily ordain. If both are commanded, one 
would expect both to be commandable, so what is the diﬀ erence? If it is a 
priori and necessary that lying is prima facie wrong, this truth will be in-
trinsic to the divine nature; but there is no reason to think that a preference 
for a particular day for the appropriate devotions is likewise intrinsic, if 
intrinsic at all. The veracity principle, then, merits divine command by its 
very nature, in the sense implying that contrary behavior merits disap-
proval even apart from being prohibited by a command actually issued; 
but the choice of a sabbatical day is a candidate for divine command in 
accord with God’s sheer preference—which could also be called discretion-
ary if ‘sheer’ is seen as implying the impossibility of reasons. The latt er 
does not imply that contrary behavior merits disapproval apart from being 
commanded; but by virtue of our relation to God, the command is itself a 
ground (and an essential one) for such disapproval. With ordinary moral 
obligations, by contrast, there are necessary facts that ground the obliga-
toriness of the acts in question; they are commandable in the light of those 
facts, but their obligatoriness does not depend on God’s issuing commands 
to perform them.
In the light of these points, we may distinguish several kinds of theo-
logical obligations. We have seen cases in which an obligation is geneti-
cally theological: their source is God’s issuing a command to do the deed 
in question. Their content may be entirely non-theological, say to honor 
one’s parents. Second, an obligation may be conceptually theological, say to 
carry out God’s will in helping the poor. A conceptually theological obligation 
need not be genetically such. Third, an obligation may also be objectually 
theological, as where it is to worship God. This obligation is not only concep-
tually theological but such that its object is doing something toward God. 
The third obligation calls for deeds that are religious, in a sense implying 
that their proper intentional performance presupposes a far-reaching the-
istic commitment. None of these obligations must be grounded in proper-
ties that are not broadly natural, but in the grounding of the fi rst and third 
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God’s specifi c commands or other theological elements must be central in 
the grounding elements. We may, however, speak of three kinds of obliga-
tion rather than three concepts of obligation because the reasons for action 
central in each case are grounded in the kinds of relationships that are 
central for ordinary moral obligation.
In the case of theological obligations as just described, it is easy to see 
that the commandability view allows that these are owed to God, in a sense 
implying that violation is a kind of wrong, or even oﬀ ense, to or toward 
God. Perhaps part of what makes divine command views att ractive to 
many theists is its capturing this idea. It is important to see that the com-
mandability view outlined here can also account for the idea. Indeed, the 
a priori necessary groundedness of moral properties in broadly natural 
ones leaves open both that obligations are owed and to whom they are 
owed; and if obligatoriness is meriting divine command, it seems clear 
that (whether one sees it or not) doing what is obligatory may be viewed 
as owed to God, and violations should be seen as a kind of oﬀ ense to 
God. So viewing obligation is both appropriate for theists (certainly for 
biblical theists) and tends to contribute to moral motivation. Moreover, 
given God’s creating and sustaining us, and given elements in God’s loving 
relationship to us, divine (issued) commands also have normative author-
ity for us. There are various ways to determine whether the authority is 
specifi cally moral or specifi cally theological. The commandability theory 
leaves several possibilities open and provides for a central role for actual 
divine commands in the lives of the religiously committ ed.21
IV. Divine Commandability, Obligation, and the Good
In part because there is an apparently essential connection between, on 
the one hand, rightness and other deontic notions, and, on the other hand, 
axiological notions like that of the good, something should be said about 
how the suggested a priori groundedness view of obligation bears on axi-
ological concepts. One might expect a divine command (or commandabil-
ity) theory of moral obligation to be extendible to the good, for instance 
to take good states of aﬀ airs to be those grounded in some divine att itude 
or likeness to some divine property. One might specify God’s anteced-
ent will as determinative here, as opposed to God’s consequent will. For 
there are evil states of aﬀ airs that God would surely not “fi nally” will, as 
opposed to permitt ing them (these might include certain malicious inten-
tions, the performance of certain wrongful free actions, and perhaps some 
resulting bad states of aﬀ airs). But there is no inconsistency in holding 
a divine command theory for deontic properties and a diﬀ erent kind of 
theory for goodness.22
Indeed, if the concept of goodness or some other far-reaching axiologi-
cal notion is not conceived as appropriately independent of divine will, 
then ascriptions of goodness to God become problematic, and we appar-
ently encounter diﬃ  culties in understanding even what it means for God 
to be loving. Clearly, being loving (toward someone) entails a disposition 
to seek or care about the good of the beloved (for its own sake, not merely 
instrumentally). Granting that God is infallible about what constitutes our 
good, there are a priori limits (vague though they are) on what this is, 
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much as there are such limits on what can be morally right. It cannot be 
for our good that we be manipulated so that we habitually lie, steal, and 
mutilate others or ourselves; or that we be tortured for no purpose other 
than to make us suﬀ er (I take this to exclude punishment and voluntary 
sacrifi ce of oneself in order to save someone else from death or suﬀ er-
ing).23 Thomas Hardy could not have been speaking of an omnibenevolent 
God when, in “Hap,” he wrote:
If but some vengeful God would call to me
From up the sky and laugh, “Thou suﬀ ering thing,
Know that they sorrow is my ecstasy,
That thy love’s loss is my hate’s profi ting,”
Then would I bear it, clench myself, and die.
This att itude is malevolent; it is incompatible with God’s nature.
As these examples suggest, the notions of the good and the right are 
intrinsically connected. For instance, one kind of goodness—moral good-
ness in persons, which is arguably the basic kind of moral goodness—is 
constituted at least mainly by a suitable kind of commitment to pursue 
the right.24 (The connection is even closer if a consequentialist ethics is 
sound, since on this kind of view right conduct is equivalent to action that 
maximizes the good.) Thus, (adequate) learning of what is right and what 
is wrong, whether by a secular or a religious route, is essential for being 
morally good. But if the concept of goodness were equivalent to that of 
what accords with divine will, then moral standards could not be inde-
pendent of divine will in the (qualifi ed) sense in which they apparently 
are. We would have in eﬀ ect an axiological counterpart of the semantic 
version of divine command theory. The concept of moral goodness would 
be explicable entirely in theological terms, and the concept of being mor-
ally good would be analyzable in terms of pursuing fulfi llment of divine 
command or of divine will. These positions seem implausible for many of 
the reasons that weigh against the counterpart semantic version of divine 
command theory as applied to moral obligation.
Even the weaker view that goodness is ontically (though not conceptu-
ally) equivalent to a theological property raises diﬃ  culties. Consider the 
words “God saw that it was good,” so prominent in Genesis. On this view, 
they are at best puzzling.25 Even apart from the problem of determining 
the theological authority of such utt erances, their applicability is at best 
diﬃ  cult to account for on the view that goodness is a theological property. 
It is presumably in large part on account of the intrinsic character, includ-
ing the beauty, of the creation that God sees it to be good, not owing to its 
relation to the divine nature, such as expressing God’s creative will.26 Cer-
tainly God knows this relation, but it is not naturally describable as “seen” 
by God, and the basis of seeing the goodness of the creation is apparently 
its intrinsic character rather than its relation to God. It appears, moreover, 
that just as God sees certain kinds of acts to be obligatory in virtue of their 
natural properties, God sees certain kinds of things to be good in virtue 
of their natural properties. In both cases, the relation between the diﬀ erent 
kinds of properties seems to be necessary. But just as any necessary truths 
are in some sense part of God’s intellectual nature, any necessary goods 
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are in some sense part of God’s volitional nature. Like the necessary moral 
truths, the necessary truths about goodness are within God, not above God. 
God may indeed be considered its highest possible exemplar.
None of this denies that our conception of goodness depends on God in 
being God-given, as life itself is. But that entails neither that the concept 
or the property of goodness is theological, nor that there is any theological 
reason to think they should be. A divine command theory of moral obliga-
tion does not require a counterpart account of the good.
V. The Moral Authority of God and the Autonomy of Ethics
If these metaethical refl ections are sound, a religiously committ ed per-
son can take moral properties to bear an a priori, consequential relation 
to broadly natural ones. This is compatible with moral properties’ being 
identical with theological ones, as well as with the omniscience of God, 
which supports God’s moral authority. It is also compatible with the idea 
that God’s issuing commands to us both creates obligations on our part 
and provides a basis for our knowledge of those obligations. This point 
goes beyond aﬃ  rming God’s infallibility in moral matt ers. The impossibil-
ity of a truth not known to God has no specifi c implications about God’s 
issuing commands.
One more aspect of the commandability theory developed here should 
be clarifi ed: its fi t with other kinds of ethical theory. Is it, for instance, com-
patible with noncognitivism, and can it explain how that view might ac-
commodate religious commitment? Many philosophers consider noncog-
nitivism a major option in ethics (as it is for some writers in philosophical 
theology27). Suppose that moral judgments are not cognitive. Imagine that 
whatever is expressed by moral sentences used in making moral judg-
ments, it lacks truth value. Then there are no moral truths to be known, 
omniscience will not imply God’s knowing them, and divine moral com-
mands must be understood noncognitively, say as expressions of att itudes. 
The normative authority of the commands may be undimished.
There need be no strict inconsistency between a noncognitivist ethic 
and a religious commitment. Perhaps even a certain kind of classical reli-
gious commitment can be squared with ethical noncognitivism. I will not 
try to show this, however, because for any plausible noncognitivist ethical 
view, it makes litt le normative diﬀ erence. Any plausible noncognitivism 
will distinguish justifi ed from unjustifi ed moral judgments. This distinc-
tion will be connected with the justifi cation of the att itudes these judg-
ments express. Thus, if my moral judgments do not take account of rel-
evant diﬀ erences and similarities, they are not justifi ed. Consider a simple 
case. I must make the same judgment about the moral character of exactly 
similar agents, such as psychological duplicates. My judgments must also 
respond to relevant facts. I cannot justifi edly hold that someone deserves 
punishment for a crime if I have no evidence that the person committ ed it. 
Being omniscient, God knows both such facts and their moral relevance. 
Relevance may be considered a cognitive matt er even on a plausible non-
cognitivist view. If we now take God’s omniscience and perfect goodness 
to imply wisdom, divine att itudes toward actions would apparently be an 
unerring guide to what our att itudes toward them should (in the objective 
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sense) be, just as divine knowledge of propositions is an unerring guide to 
what beliefs we should (in the objective sense) have.28
A noncognitivist ethics may, then, be adapted to a classical theistic com-
mitment (for which God is omnicompetent). In principle, it leaves open 
the same range of moral standards for human life as does cognitivism. 
Still, since noncognitivism is neither the ethical position I think most plau-
sible nor standard among thoughtful theists, I will assume that moral 
judgments are cognitive.
So far, I have mainly concentrated on metaethical questions. What 
about normative matt ers? Some normative theories are incompatible with 
one or another religion. But what range of normative positions suits a 
commitment simply to classical theism combined with the commandabil-
ity theory? It might seem that apart from a particular theology, religious 
scripture, or tradition, classical theism so interpreted does not rule out any 
normative ethical position. But this does not follow. One way to show that 
is to argue for substantive moral truths that can be accounted for only by 
a certain range of normative theories. Here I want simply to suggest why 
it holds on the assumption that God is not only omnibenevolent, but also 
loves us.29
If God loves human persons, then they must have a kind of worth, a 
value they possess in virtue of their intrinsic nature and not merely instru-
mentally. It is not possible to love a being just for its instrumental value; 
and supposing this were possible, such love would be at best imperfect 
and God, as supremely perfect, could not so love us. Even the worst of us 
might be inherently redeemable. That we must have a kind of inherent 
worth if we are loved by God is perhaps not implied by God’s omniscience 
alone—though it would be if loving someone should imply believing the 
person to have worth. But we can take God to be unerring in a wider, non-
propositional sense as well, extending to love and to related att itudes and 
emotions. This point is implicit in the idea of perfection, even if not deduc-
ible from omniscience alone.30
On the additional assumption that we are created in God’s image, the 
point is even more clearly entailed, and the degree of implied human 
worth might be plausibly taken to be higher. To be sure, from persons’ 
having worth in the eyes of God, nothing highly specifi c follows about 
how they should be treated. But it seems clear that what has worth in the 
eyes of God—whose judgments of value are infallible under any plausible 
construal of omniscience—must be treated with respect. Here again, it is 
possible to see the object of the obligation as human beings while taking 
the obligation to be owed to God.
It will be clear that one implication of God’s viewing us as having genu-
ine worth is that we may not be treated merely as means. So far, one of 
course thinks of the negative requirement of Kant’s intrinsic end formu-
lation of the Categorical Imperative. But what about its positive injunc-
tion: that all rational beings must be treated as ends? On any plausible 
understanding of this, freedom of worship is essential; and if we add that 
God takes us to have worth at least in part because we are—in our natural 
state as created by God—free agents, it would be reasonable to think that 
proper standards for human conduct should support a more extensive 
liberty than is implied by freedom of worship by itself.
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The Categorical Imperative is not the whole of Kantian ethics; and even 
on a charitable reading of Kant, the intrinsic end formulation is by no 
means clearly equivalent to the other formulations of the Imperative. But 
the Imperative is the core of Kantian ethics; and the worth of persons—
sometimes called dignity by Kant—is an essential element in its basis.31 
Since Kant was Christian, it is no surprise that his ethics is consistent with 
classical theism. It also seems to bear a plausible interpretation on which 
it is highly consonant with Christian ethics, but that is a question for an-
other occasion.
Critics of Kantian ethics have noted that it is far from clear what spe-
cifi c normative principles follow from the Categorical Imperative, even 
if we abstract from the diversity of its formulations.32 A kindred theory 
that att empts to circumvent this diﬃ  culty is intuitionism, particularly as 
articulated by Ross in The Right and the Good. Ross believed that no over-
arching principle accounts for all our duties. Instead, he proposed a list 
consisting of duties of justice, non-injury, benefi cence, promissory fi delity, 
veracity, reparation, self-improvement, and gratitude. A case can be made 
that these are very much the duties that a conscientious interpretation of 
the Categorical Imperative would yield as applications. But rather than 
pursue that point,33 I simply want to stress that on any plausible interpre-
tation of the Rossian duties, embracing them as basic moral standards is 
consistent with religious commitment combined with the kind of divine 
commandability theory described above.
By contrast with both Kantian ethics and intuitionism as deontological 
views, utilitarianism is consequentialist. These classifi cations are diﬃ  cult 
to explicate briefl y, but the contrast important here is between the deonto-
logical emphasis on ascribing moral signifi cance to act-types as such and 
the consequentialist commitment to deriving the moral signifi cance of ac-
tions from facts about their consequences, paradigmatically the hedonic 
consequences central for utilitarianism. For a broad consequentialism, the 
pleasure or pain of performing an action can be considered a consequence, 
even though simultaneous with the action; and non-hedonic consequences 
may also be morally relevant. But the intrinsic character of the action, such 
as its being a lie, is not. If there is inconsistency between consequentialism 
and classical theism, this is the main point at which it occurs. Let us just 
consider Mill’s utilitarianism.
Can Mill’s utilitarianism accommodate the inherent worth of persons? 
If one takes pleasure and freedom from pain as the only intrinsic goods, 
one might think that the worth of persons must be instrumental to real-
izing these hedonic values. But that does not clearly follow. If pleasure on 
the part of persons must be realized by their experiences, these experienc-
es are constitutive of pleasure, not means to it; and the person having the 
experience is essential, not instrumental, to its occurrence. The pleasure of 
playing an instrument requires playing it and entails a person’s experienc-
ing the playing. The pleasure is constituted by the experience’s being of a 
certain kind.
It is true, however, that for any consequentialism, the value of persons 
is dependent, as opposed to being intrinsic to their nature; their existence 
by itself would yield neither pleasure nor have any other good conse-
quences. The value of persons is realized in what they bring about or in 
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what is brought about, or occurs, in them. By contrast, for deontological 
views (as for at least Christianity among world religions), an act of ly-
ing—and presumably even forming an intention to lie—can degrade the 
worth of the agent quite apart from any consequences; and treating people 
disrespectfully can be incongruent with their intrinsic worth regardless of 
its consequences. One might insult them in words audible only to oneself 
and quickly forgott en. This action is still disrespectful.
Do these points show that utilitarians cannot recognize the full worth 
of persons that is implicit in viewing human persons as created by God 
conceived as loving them?34 It is true that, at least for a consequential-
ism of the kind utilitarianism represents, such properties of persons as 
their virtues or the benevolent state of their wills have no intrinsic worth, 
whereas for other ethical theories these are valuable independently of 
their consequences. The problem (which I cannot pursue here) is how a 
theistic consequentialist can avoid conceiving persons as merely of instru-
mental value in virtue of producing, as a consequence of their actions, 
some quantity of the good.35
Two other ethical perspectives should be mentioned: natural law theory 
and virtue ethics. Clearly a natural law theory is compatible with classical 
theism. Indeed, it may not be plausible apart from that worldview, since 
the normative authority of natural patt erns otherwise seems insuﬃ  ciently 
justifi able. Such a theory may also allow for the epistemic autonomy of 
ethics, as it apparently does in for Aquinas. As to classical virtue ethics, 
one possibility of special interest here is an ethics of virtue that takes love 
as the central virtue. Certainly a central role for love in human conduct is 
suggested by Jesus’s treating ‘Love thy God’ and ‘Love thy neighbor’ as 
the greatest commandments. In any case, the worth of persons is primary 
in virtue ethics. It is exemplifi ed by a virtuous nature; and persons—as 
virtuous—are the basic standard of moral conduct. Respect for freedom 
can also be accommodated to this framework. There is much left  inde-
terminate—or to be determined in context—by a virtue ethic. But what 
is determinate in it is consistent with the divine command ethical theory 
developed here.
______________________
There is, then, much latitude in normative ethics for classical theism 
combined with a divine command ethics of the kind suggested here. This 
does not imply that just any ethical theory comports with classical the-
ism. I do not see how an egoistic theory could (assuming that should be 
counted as an ethical theory at all); and it may be plausibly argued that 
consequentialist theories do not comport as well with it as deontologi-
cal theories or virtue ethics. But the latitude here is still wide. As to the 
metaethical latitude possible for classical theism, and for Christianity in 
particular, I believe that a divine command theory of the kind suggested 
here is a possible option consonant with religious reverence for God and 
Scripture, but also compatible with giving to natural reason the kind of 
major role in ethical thinking that, on the leading metaethical theories, it 
appears to have.36
University of Notre Dame
DIVINE COMMAND MORALITY  139
NOTES
1. Even here I speak mainly about philosophical theology as pertaining 
chiefl y to Christianity and Judaism. I leave aside the rejection, e.g. by process 
theologians, of omnipotence.
2. I consider it arguable that a kind of constitution relation can also be an 
identity relation. Being water is arguably both identical with and constituted 
by being H2O; but being constituted by a certain piece of bronze with a par-
ticular shape is not identical with being (say) the Rodin statue in question. In 
the latt er case, however, perhaps we have a composition relation that is not a 
constitution relation (or not the kind that is also an identity one).
3. Note that not all non-moral properties are non-natural in any narrow 
sense. Suppose God saves my life on a given occasion. God’s saving my life 
is a non-normative property and is natural in the broad sense of ‘descriptive,’ 
but it is also “supernatural.” To rule that this act cannot ground an obliga-
tion of gratitude begs the question against theism. Consider also a religious 
obligation, say to worship God. Arguably, if this is moral, its basis is broadly 
natural properties, e.g. omniscience, indicating God’s having grandeur of 
the worship-demanding kind. I should add that where I use ‘consequential’ 
some would use ‘supervenient’; the former is preferable in carrying on its 
face the main idea I am invoking, and for some people supervenience con-
nects only types of properties, say the moral and the natural, and not specifi c 
instantiations of properties. It is very diﬃ  cult to specify what constitutes a 
moral property, but nothing in this paper turns on leaving that unanalyzed. 
An indication of how one might characterize the moral point of view (as op-
posed, e.g., to the prudential) and moral properties is provided in my Practi-
cal Reasoning and Ethical Decision (London: Routledge, 2006), esp. pp. 173–76. 
Moral obligation will be connected with theological obligation, which it can 
overlap, below.
4. This notion of embeddedness is suggested in my initial essay in Robert 
Audi and Nicholas Wolterstorﬀ , Religion in the Public Square: The Place of Re-
ligious Convictions in Political Debate (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Litt lefi eld, 
1997), n. 21.
5. I take this suggestion from “Determination and Property Identity” 
(MS), by Paul Audi (and should note that he allows vacuous satisfaction of the 
clause for any property that is basic in the sense that what possess it does not 
have it in virtue of any other property). The other necessary condition he pro-
poses for property identity (apparently also satisfi ed by the suggested divine 
command view proposed) is that whatever being F grounds is also grounded 
by being G, and conversely. This is not the place to defend a criterion of prop-
erty identity. I might add, however, that virtually any such criterion implies 
that F = G only if they are necessarily equivalent, and that condition is clearly 
met by the property equivalences I consider plausible.
6. In at least the former case, the question of how the view preserves di-
vine freedom arises, but this kind of question confronts any view on which 
God does not determine necessary truths. I see no more reason to take the 
unalterability of necessary truths to undermine God’s freedom than to take it 
to undermine God’s omnipotence. (This is not to deny that there is much to 
puzzle about here.)
7. Theists also commonly hold or presuppose that God is a necessary be-
ing. I assume this here; but note that even supposing there is a Godless pos-
sible world in which certain act-types are obligatory for persons, that world 
would not contain us human beings if we have the indexical property of being 
created by God.
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8. At least on the assumption that there can be at most one omnicompetent 
being (and that God exists necessarily), indexed and general commandability 
would be equivalent, but this would not imply their identity as properties.
9. Cf. the view that “Principles of moral obligation constituted by divine 
commands are not timeless truths, because the commands are given by signs 
that occur in time. People who are not in a region of space-time in which a sign 
can be known are not subject to it.” See Robert Merrihew Adams, Finite and 
Infi nite Goods (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 270. It appears that 
the constitution relation here intended by Adams, as opposed to the relation 
posited in what I call divine commandability theory, precludes a priori status 
for the relevant moral principles. Cf. John Hare: “Divine command theory, as 
I shall defend it, is the theory that what makes something obligatory for us is 
that God commands it.” See God’s Call (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans, 
2001), p. 49 (italics added).
10. If a consequence does not clearly follow, and if for this reason rational 
conscientious people may disagree about whether it does, it is not clear that 
it should be taken to be commanded (at least for ordinary people). There are 
also logical consequences that clearly do follow but involve long disjunctions 
and red herrings; these seem inappropriate to constitute divine commands. 
In technical language, the class of divine commands is apparently not closed 
under entailment or even self-evident entailment. Even the class of prima fa-
cie obligations does not seem closed under either condition, particularly the 
entailment condition; but it does seem true that closure is less restricted for 
obligations than for commands.
11. I argue for this point and discuss how the Biblical love commands may 
be obeyed in “The Ethics of Love and the Love of Others,” in progress.
12. Presumably any plausible divine command ethics should take account 
of this point, since it will seek to make sense of our possibly discovering the 
moral status of an action regarding which there is no divine command—un-
less, of course, it is supposed that God has already set forth a complete set of 
moral axioms and implicitly commands any act implied, by however many 
intermediate steps, in the axioms. We should also note that what accords with 
God’s will here must be more than simply consented to by God, since otherwise 
evils whose existence is contingent (which is perhaps all of them) would have 
to be conceived as divinely willed.
13. If obligatoriness is commandedness, it is not also grounded in that. So 
although commandedness is a “descriptive” property and can ground some 
properties, it cannot (on the suggested view) ground obligatoriness.
14. See W. D. Ross, The Right and the Good (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1930), esp. chap. 2.
15. Here I follow Adams, Finite and Infi nite Goods, p. 259. For further dis-
cussion of how to conceive God’s antecedent and consequent willing in rela-
tion to divine command theory see Mark C. Murphy, “Divine Command, Di-
vine Will, and Moral Obligation,” Faith and Philosophy 15, 1 (1998), pp. 3–27.
16. One might wonder how supererogatory acts fi t this classifi cation. 
Since they are not obligatory (commandable in the relevant sense), are they 
still prima facie obligatory, since (apparently) in accordance with God’s ante-
cedent will? I see no diﬃ  culty in saying so. If they are beyond the call of duty, 
should they not also encompass it? Consider the paradigms: doing good for 
one or more others beyond what they can expect on the basis of one’s (fi nal) 
obligations. There is in such cases a prima facie obligation of benefi cence; but 
it does not predominate in cases of supererogation: other obligations or one’s 
rights give one moral freedom to abstain. We might see God as unwilling 
to command such deeds in any blanket fashion (presumably owing to the 
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complexity of the situations the relevant agents face), but as subject to disap-
pointment at their non-performance, though not the kind of disapproval ap-
propriate to failure to fulfi ll what, as according with God’s consequent will, 
merits divine command.
17. Philip L. Quinn addresses this diﬃ  culty in “Divine Command Theo-
ry,” in Hugh LaFollett e, ed., Ethical Theory (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000), esp. pp. 
54–63. Quinn also discusses Adams’s competing view, on which God’s com-
mands are morally central. Cf. Richard Swinburne’s view that “There are cer-
tain minimal duties to one’s fellow men which are duties whether or not there 
is a God” and “As all actions that are good for other reasons [besides being 
objects of a divine commandment] are also commanded by God, in each case 
there are two reasons for doing the action and two good desires which we 
could indulge by doing it.” See Responsibility and Atonement (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1989), pp. 123 and 134 respectively.
18. Suppose honoring our parents is an a priori and necessary prima facie 
obligation; then God’s commanding it would, by virtue of our special relation 
to God, be an additional source of obligation and would hence create an addi-
tional degree of obligation to do this; this may be called an additional obliga-
tion so long as it is not taken to imply a diﬀ erent behavioral object. For much 
discussion of how God creates obligations, see Richard Swinburne, “Morality 
and God,” Revue Internationale de Philosophie 225 (2003), pp. 315–28.
19. Here I draw on chap. 6 of The Architecture of Reason (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2001), in which I called the view that moral reasons for ac-
tion are the “highest” kind the moral paramountcy view. Note that the theologi-
cal paramountcy view formulated in the text does not entail that theological 
reasons are supreme, in the sense that in a confl ict between a theological reason 
and any set of diﬀ erent kinds of reasons, the former is always preponderant. 
If, however, obligatoriness is commandability, it is at best unclear how a fi nal 
moral obligation could confl ict with an overall, as opposed to prima facie, 
theological reason.
20. This view may be fruitfully compared with John Hare’s point (with 
which it seems compatible) that “there is nothing heteronymous about will-
ing to obey a superior’s prescription because a superior has prescribed it, in a 
discretionary way, as long as the fi nal end is shared between us, and we have 
trust also about the route” (op. cit. p. 115).
21. My project does not require distinguishing sharply between the moral 
and other points of view. The same kind of theory will apply to any norma-
tive ‘ought,’ including even the prudential ‘ought,’ if one takes God to care 
about us in such a way that anything we ought to do is commandable in the 
relevant sense.
22. Adams, in “A Modifi ed Divine Command Theory,” in The Virtue of Faith 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), notes this view and cites Locke as a 
case in point. See esp. pp. l08–09.
23. Cf. Linda Zagzebski’s view that “Value in all forms derives from God, 
in particular from God’s motives. God’s motives are perfectly good, and hu-
man motives are good insofar as they are like divine motives.” See “Morality 
and Religion,” in William J. Wainwright, ed., The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy 
of Religion (Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 359. Since this is an exemplar-
ist virtue theory, the goodness of God’s motives is not to be understood in 
terms of the goodness of anything else. But since “being loving is one of God’s 
essential motives” (p. 360), the Euthyphro problem is solved without the ar-
bitrariness that (she holds) Adams’s view incurs, since “There is no intrinsic 
connection between a command and the property of being loving, so to tie 
morality to the commands of a loving God is to tie it to two distinct proper-
ties of God” (p. 360). On my view, which (like Adams’s), coincides with hers 
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in taking God to be loving, there is an intrinsic connection: being loving is in 
part being strongly and intrinsically disposed to care about the good of the 
beloved for its own sake, where this good is in part a matt er of fl ourishing in 
familiar ways that involve well-being, e.g. in the happy exercise of rational 
capacities and the absence of pain and suﬀ ering. Such caring does not dictate, 
but does constrain, what a loving being will command.
24. This is surely Kant’s view in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Mor-
als, fi rst section.
25. This is not to deny that these words may be puzzling in any case. But if 
the goodness of something depends on God’s will as it would on a certain sort 
of axiological voluntarism, then what God sees is a certain kind of relation to 
God’s will, as opposed to the character of the creation that God has brought 
into being.
26. It must be granted that if God’s seeing that it was good is taken to 
entail discovering this, then Genesis would apparently be presupposing a lack 
of omniscience. My assumption is that even an omnipotent being might not 
necessarily see, in the relevant, partly perceptual sense, everything it knows, 
and might have a sense of the goodness of what is seen that is grounded in its 
properties and is diﬃ  cult to account for on a strongly voluntaristic view of the 
goodness in question.
27. See, e.g., D. Z. Phillips, “Philosophy, Theology, and the Reality of God,” 
Philosophical Quarterly 13 (1963), reprinted as “Grammar and Religious Belief,” 
in Brian Davies, ed., Philosophy of Religion (Blackwell, 2000), pp. 108–14.
28. For a detailed case that one might have an ethics that is at once realist 
and prescriptivist, see John Hare, “Prescriptive Realism,” forthcoming. My 
points to reconcile a noncognitivst ethics with a version of divine command 
ethics seem to apply even more readily to the kind of nondescriptivist theory 
he outlines.
29. Perhaps a case can be made that, given God’s omnibenevolence and 
certain facts about the creation, God’s creating us implies a kind of love to-
ward us, but here I simply assume (with Adams) that the most important con-
ception of God appropriate to a divine command theory is of a loving God. 
This approach is entirely consistent with my case for a set of substantive mor-
al principles in The Good in the Right: A Theory of Intuition and Intrinsic Value 
(Princeton University Press, 2004).
30. God’s taking us to have worth would follow from omniscience on the 
assumption that such worth is consequential on a natural base of properties 
we possess and God knows this fact. Insofar as it is plausible to think that 
it is thus consequential, we might say that our inherent worth is at least not 
wholly constituted by God’s loving us—as opposed to its basis being owed to 
the intrinsic properties we are endowed with through the creative power of 
that love.
31. For a major statement of Kant’s position on the notions of worth and 
dignity, see the Groundwork, Sect. 2.
32. A full-scale critique of Kant on this and related points is given by Der-
ek Parfi t in Climbing the Mountain (forthcoming).
33. Considerable discussion of this point is provided in my “A Kantian 
Intuitionism,” Mind 110, p. 439 (2001).
34. Critics of utilitarianism have said that it does not take persons serious-
ly. See, e.g., John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1993).
35. For a careful att empt to show utilitarianism consistent with theism, 
see James A. Keller, Faith and Philosophy, 1 (1980). Cf. chap. 4 of The Good in the 
Right, which provides reasons to doubt that any maximizing consequential-
ism can do full justice to the value of persons.
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36. This paper has benefi ted from discussions at the University of Oxford, 
where a much earlier version was given in 2001 as one of the Wilde Lectures; 
at Biola University in 2004; in a seminar at Santa Clara University in 2005; in 
the Center for the Philosophy of Religion at Notre Dame in 2006; and at the 
2006 meeting of the SCP in Chicago, where an earlier version, given as the 
Kenneth Konyndyk Memorial Lecture, received very helpful comments from 
John Hare. For other helpful comments I am also grateful to more colleagues 
and students than I can name and to Paul Audi, Peter Byrne, Kevin Hart, Brian 
Left ow, Hugh McCann, and, especially, Richard Swinburne and an anony-
mous reader for the Journal.
